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AUTONOMY AND RISK TAKING

Research with Human Subjects
as a Paradigm in Teaching
Larry I. Palmer

As a university administrator, I worry about the form
and substance of undergraduate education and about
ways to encourage interdisciplinary perspectives on
problems in a research university dominated by particular specialized disciplines. I also continue to teach a
seminar in Cornell's Biology & Society Program for undergraduates and to assist others in teaching a course
called "Medical Humanities" for second-year medical
students. In the course of these administrative and
teaching activities, I find myself returning to Jay Katz's
Experimentation with Human Beings' -both as model
for teaching and as a perspective for institutional learning and change 2 -as a model for professional action.
Jay Katz's approach to research with human subjects
provides an excellent framework for analyzing the nature of teaching not simply in professional or continuing
education programs in law, medicine, or social work,
but in undergraduate programs as well. In my view,
changing the ways in which universities help students to
learn at all levels can be analyzed through the process of
reflection, action, and evaluation developed in Katz's
seminal work on human experimentation and most recently expounded in his suggested reforms of professional medical education in The Silent World of Doctor
and Patient. 3 For Jay Katz, the scholar who guided me
to the realization that teaching and administering within
the university at all levels is essentially a problem in
human research, I offer this tribute.
First, through reference to his analytical perspectives
and some of his materials that I have used in courses and
seminars in law school, medical college, and undergraduate college settings over the past fifteen years, I will
illustrate why Katz's perspective is essential to understanding the fundamental issues in law and medicine.
Second, to provide a perspective on the current crisis in
undergraduate education, I will outline the concept of
"knowledge processes," derived in part from Katz's

work and in part from my own teaching. This so-called
crisis is indicative of a basic confusion about the purposes of higher education and research generally, not
just research with human subjects in our society. 4 I will
end with a story-a personal story about my own teaching-that is a fitting tribute to Jay Katz, the scholar who
always teaches.
Science, Medicine, and the Law
As basic social institutions in modern society, science,
medicine, and law are important sources of authority
for resolving the ethical dilemmas of our time. Each of
these institutions creates metaphors that guide often
conflicting decision-making processes. Medicine, for instance, whose practitioners epitomize the notion of the
"helping professional," suggests for many the highest
ideals of healing. Law evokes multiple images of rights,
order, and justice. Science, to modern men and women,
elicits an almost religious view of rationality. In teaching
law and medicine to undergraduates, law students, and
medical students, I have found Katz's work to be an
important resource for helping them sort out the various
meanings of authority within science, medicine, and law
and think about the interrelationships in ways that are
beneficial both to their future clients and to society. I
suggest that it is not what physicians or lawyers do that
is the starting point for analysis of the issues of law and
medicine; rather, it is an institutional view of science
which provides the framework.
Science is an important social institution because it
responds to an important human need, the quest for
knowledge. Whether it be the curiosity of the child who
drops the feeding dish to see what happens or Newton's
wonder at a falling object moving in an arc, this quest
for knowledge about the world seems inherent in man.
The modern scientific enterprise is the institutional man-
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ifestation of this basic human need. We often confuse
what scientifically-trained individuals do with the institution of science itself. This confusion of the institution
of science with the practice of professionals often leads
us to ignore the pervasive influence of science upon the
way we view the world. We expect, for instance, managers in business enterprises to be professional in the
sense that they supposedly rely upon the "science of
management," which itself may be based on mechanistic
views of organizations. 5 Once it is clear that the paradigms of science are the backbone of modern professionalism, many of the issues in law and medicine can be
seen as recurringly inadequate human attempts of physicians, lawyers, judges, and legislators to apply scientific notions of expertise to deal with disease, decay, and
death. Thus, much of my teaching about law and medicine is an attempt to help students develop a way of
thinking about professional ethics in the context of science, medicine, and law.
Katz's process approach to human experimentation
has always helped me beat back the pedagogical demon
that seems to possess modern students at all stages of
their educational development. This demon, in my view,
assumes that ethical reasoning for the real world is simply a self-generated ethical theory, detached from human beings and the wider social context.
My approach to professional ethics in medicine is
built on the assumption that professionals always operate in an organizational and institutional context. This
approach is best exemplified by "The Jewish Chronic
Disease Hospital Case," the introductory case in Experimentation with Human Beings. 6 This case, involving
two physicians who conducted experiments using live
cancer cells on debilitated patients, remains the paradigm for teaching students about physicians' roles under
modern conditions. The case is so rich with paradoxes
about professional ambitions and professional service,
organizational politics at both the staff and board of
director levels, and the relationship of courts and administrative agencies to the drama, that students never
leave this case with the unequivocal feeling that the experiments should be condemned. Rather they see that
the forces that prompted the experiments to be conducted in the first place require thorough analysis in
order that appropriate controls may be imposed to prevent repetition of a like experiment in the future.
For two reasons, the role of the physician is the fundamental issue for a teacher of law and medicine. First,
any type of legal intervention into medical decisions
must confront the typical layperson's response to the
physician as a revered and esteemed member of the community. He or she is viewed not simply as healer but as
a modern day "high priest."' Second, the problems that
law must confront in modern medicine do not in fact
arise in the context of the physician practicing the art of

healing, but rather in his or her applying the techniques
of science to the problems of disease and decay. Katz's
work captures these two essential features of the physician's role in modern society: As the practitioners of
medicine have relied upon science for their authority,
the lay public has assumed that the authority of the
physician lies in his art of healing.
In trying to resolve the conflict between a rapidly
emerging biomedical capacity to treat disease and a patient population imbued with notions of healing, we
have relied upon legalistic notions of consent.
"Consent" has become the new source of authority for
a confused public and the beleaguered professionals.
Katz, beginning in Experimentation with Human Beings, and most recently with The Silent World of Doctor
and Patient, challenged the conventional wisdom of our
times that issues of consent will resolve most ethical
dilemmas. In his early work Katz dared to ask three
fundamental questions: What are the functions of consent? What limitations are inherent in informed consent? What limitations should be imposed on informed
consent? 8 While these questions are in a sense unanswerable, they help the teacher of medical malpractice
cases to be wary of assuming that a legal requirement of
consent resolves the underlying issue of legitimate use of
authority.
Katz, addressing these issues in expository form in
The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, demonstrates
why law's reliance on informed consent is an illusionary
"fairy tale."9 He does not argue that consent is never
possible, but rather that consent that respects the autonomy of patients requires a radically new conceptualization of the physician's role.
According to Katz, modern physicians know more
about what they do not know about the effectiveness of
treatments than did their counterparts only fifty years
ago. Thanks to the advance of scientific knowledge, the
modern physician now knows why some treatments
work for some patients while others do not. Ironically,
the growth of scientific knowledge in medical practice
has in fact increased the degree of uncertainty under
which physicians must operate. 1 ° Katz argues that physicians must learn how to share their own uncertainties
with patients in order for there to be true informed consent, and suggests further that physicians who are able
to share with the patient what is known and unknown
about a proposed treatment are in fact more scientific in
their discussion of risks with patients. 1 1 Too many practitioners' attempts to deal with the issues of uncertainty
in professional practice fail to distinguish between law,
medicine, and science as sources of authority. Physicians
call upon the authority of the mystery of the art of medicine in refusing to discuss with the patient what a scientific evaluation of his or her medical art might reveal.
Similarly, some physicians use legal determinations of
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what is required to be told to a patient to meet the
requirement of informed consent in a given situation.
In arriving at his conclusion, Katz does not sanction
what is at best the pseudo-scientific approach that views
risks in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. For the patient
consulting a surgeon about a malignancy in her breast,
for instance, the risk of disfigurement may have more
significance than the surgeon is able to understand. Such
physicians usually adopt their own interpretation of
risks without understanding the degree of their own selfinterest involved in these definitions. For instance, for
years, surgeons recommended radical mastectomies
without any clinical evidence to support such uniform
treatment of patients. With greater self-awareness, a
surgeon might be able to inform a patient of the risks
involved in radiation without surgery in such a fashion
as to allow the patient to consult a radiologist without a
loss of the patient's self-respect. It is far too easy for the
physician, trained under the ethos of science, to attach
to those who fail to follow his or her advice or orders
the label of stupid, irrational, or even unscientific.
It is nearly impossible to teach about any issue of law
and medicine without understanding how modern medical training and subsequent practice are grounded in
modern notions of science. Although modern healthcare professionals do not conduct certified clinical trials,
we are increasingly aware that the best of practicing
physicians are in fact empirical scientists-not applied
scientists-who improve upon their understanding of
patients and the effectiveness of treatment through
cases. Such practitioners are able to generate questions
as they move from case to case and, in effect, learn to
live with the uncertainties of their successes and failures.
Katz's work on human experimentation provides a
framework for explaining the successes and failures involved in applying scientific theories to human beings.
For lawyers, Katz's work on human experimentation
helps them to resist two tendencies. First, it dispels the
political-moral notion of some scientists that scientific research and human progress are inevitably linked.
Some law-trained persons, as representatives of law, a
conserving and slow-moving institution, are tempted to
work to remove legal barriers to morally- and ethicallysuspect medical practices under the guise of facilitating
"progress"; by contrast, others see law as the last bastion against the technological domination of our lives
and deaths. Katz's work suggests that a new moral order
could emerge if law-trained persons learned to assess
scientific issues in terms of the values law seeks to uphold. Such an analysis does not lead to an easy, narrow
view of any particular medical issue that law must confront, but it does provide future practitioners of various
professions with some of the skills necessary to resolve
them.
Katz's analysis makes the neophyte physician aware

of the importance of using science in shaping his or her
perspective on patients, and his or her view on the appropriateness of interventions. The medical student at a
prestigious medical school, for instance, quickly learns
that status within the medical profession is linked to the
biomedical research laboratory and the use of new techniques. Very little public or professional acclaim is afforded the surgeon who has consistently and competently performed routine procedures such as gall bladder
removal. Rather, our public and professional attention
is riveted on those surgeons who perform the more innovative and supposedly "heroic" surgeries-liver
transplants, artificial heart implants, fetal cell transplants, etc. The young physician with Katz's perspective,
however, is acutely aware that these are the procedures
with the highest risks of mortality and that some presently accepted techniques such as mitral valve surgery
started with 75 percent rate of mortality. ' 2 To appreciate the value of "frontier" procedures, the young physician must first develop a perspective on the inherent
worth of his or her craft or art by recognizing that caring for the individual patient is essential to the ethos of
service of the medical profession.
For the undergraduates in Cornell's Biology and Society Program, many of whom are planning professional
careers of some kind, Katz's analytic perspective encourages them to question whether the supposed scientific
rationality, or the "technical rationality,"' 3 as Donald
Schon has suggested, provides the only basis for professional knowledge in practice. While concerned with the
effects of modern biological developments in human
medicine, environmental practices, and agriculture,
these students are beginning to explore the meaning of
"expertise" or "professional knowledge." They recognize that medicine occupies a high place in our thinking
about professional knowledge, since the physician's
practical knowledge is supposedly based upon
"scientific" knowledge. It is here, within the first stage
of the modern university, that we can begin to discuss
the processes of knowledge creation, acquisition, and
use in the service or disservice of human needs-what I
will call "knowledge processes."
Let me illustrate knowledge processes by starting, in
Katz-like fashion, with two questions:
Are the institutions of law and the family legitimate sources of authority for resolving the ethical
dilemmas that modern medicine faces?
Or are physicians instead to look only to the institution of medicine in resolving the ethical dilemmas they encounter in practice?
We, as educated laypeople, know intuitively, for instance, that the question of continuing treatment for a
cancer patient is not simply a technical matter for the
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physician. Nor is it just a question for the family members, if there are any; for under some circumstances,
particularly when children are patients, law might be
asked to intervene. 14 Yet I believe we are all tempted in
this scientifically-oriented society to convert these questions in subtle and indirect ways into technical decisions. Few will actually argue that the physician alone
should decide all ethical dilemmas, but unless we have a
conception of knowledge or a means of presenting information across disciplines, we will be tempted to argue that only scientists should decide, or only physicians
should decide, or only patients or judges should decide.
In reality we know that the social workers, hospital administrators, state regulatory officials, as well as family
members are all part of the social community with some
stake in the decision to continue or discontinue treatment. As I stated, tongue-in-cheek, in my long commentary on Katz's Experimentation with Human Beings:

ideal of talking across the disciplines. This ability is particularly desirable for those educated persons who seek
to exercise the authority associated with being called a
"professional."
While the Katz framework helped the students learn
to synthesize materials, it allowed me to develop a way
of teaching about the problems of professional ethics
from the multidisciplinary perspective espoused by
Katz. If we recognize, at the most fundamental level,
that most issues in professional ethics have as their basis
some type of professional knowledge, what then is the
source of that knowledge? In my view our modern conceptions of knowledge are aligned with the modern research university. Over the last hundred years, we have
developed the extraordinary idea that universities are
places where knowledge is created. 1 7 Within this institutional construct of knowledge, society has developed
organizational structures that represent particular kinds
of knowledge. In the case of medicine we can think of
"medical education" as an organizational structure that
includes an undergraduate degree, a medical college degree, an internship, a residency, specialty training, and
continuing education. To put the matter in Donald
Schon's terms, these processes of certification and training constitute the "professional knowledge" that society
expects the modern physician to have. 18
But modern society has a major organizational structure in which the physician and other health-care professionals operate-the hospital. Presently, however,
economic and bureaucratic pressures could lead to
change in that organizational structure, as health maintenance organizations, profit-making hospitals, and cost
containment begin to dominate the national debate
about health care in this country. 19 By identifying the
organizational context in which health-care professionals operate, we can identify a host of issues latent in
many discussions of professional ethics. For instance, it
might be assumed that the physician is the ultimate authority on all decisions involving patients in hospitals
because physicians as professionals have greater professional knowledge than nurses or social workers. The
decision to transfer a patient from the hospital to the
nursing home is supposedly made by the physician when
in fact nurses and social workers have crucial or equal
roles to play in helping the patient and the family to deal
with the decision. I cannot in this space argue about the
importance of seeing professionals in their organizational context, 20 but if my assertion is correct, that professionals must be seen in this way, the question then
becomes what is it that society expects physicians and
other professionals to do?
Specifically, physicians deal with the social constructs of disease and death. Although the neophyte or
pre-professional seeks to resist such a social construct at
first and talk instead about serving patients or clients, it

Katz's major mistake, in my opinion, is that he
wrote a law school text that intelligent laymen can
read, understand, and enjoy. What will we lawyers
do if non-experts understand our inadequacies in
an important area such as human
experimentation? 1 5
Katz's work is important because he gives us an analytical framework for talking across the disciplines and a
way of framing the issues so that the educated layperson
can participate in resolving ethical dilemmas of physicians, scientists, and other professionals or experts.
I have expanded upon Katz's framework in a seminar in the Biology and Society Program for undergraduates entitled "Institutions and Social Responsibility."
In this seminar, students developed an analysis of some
of the dilemmas of modern biology from an institutional
perspective. An interdisciplinary group--a biologist, a
social psychologist, an anthropologist, a philosopher, a
teacher of English composition, 16 a graduate student in
sociology, and I, a lawyer-agreed, finally, on the objective of the course. A team of students would develop
a "case study" around three broad topics: genetic
screening, the bovine growth hormone case, and the
right to die.
Katz's "Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital Case" was
selected as the model case study in the best interdisciplinary fashion. While these undergraduates were, of
course, unable to come close to matching the brilliance
or the analytical rigor of Katz's work in their final written projects, their ability to synthesize diverse materials
and apply their newly-found knowledge to their various
problems was quite extraordinary. By the end of the
semester, they were able to reexamine the question
asked initially in the course-Is there a difference between institutions and organizations?-in light of the
materials assigned in a way that came close to the Katz
186
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is apparent that the image of the physician as the "protector of health" or "the fighter against death" creates
the ethical dilemmas that concern us. In addition, such
grandiose characterizations as "preservers of life" create
in the minds of physicians the illusion of an imperial
mission rather than an attitude that is more reflective of
their roles in society. 2 '
I asked a group of medical students recently to consider whether being a physician or professional is a public or private role. Their initial response was to think of
their ethical dilemmas as involving their private sense of
values. But with further questioning, it became apparent
that they needed to have a deeper understanding of their
public roles which could accommodate conflicting values about the meaning of life, death, and disease. Arguing that physicians deal with public or social constructs
such as disease allowed for discussion of physicians'
roles and their performance of those roles.
But even more significant than the humbling effect
on professionals of a social construct such as disease or
death is the knowledge that other institutions such as
the family and law deal with similar social constructs. In
teaching about professional ethics, the analysis must be
done at such a level that other disciplinary perspectives
have relevance. The difficulty that we have in teaching
about professional ethics is that we have too often conceived of the problem as a dyad between the professional and the client. 22 Katz's work on human experimentation introduced me to professional ethics as a generic issue for modern society, not simply for the
biomedical researcher but for all those who purport to
exercise authority in the name of knowledge. 23 Those of
us who are not physicians should be aware that Katz's
implicit message in The Silent World of Doctor and
. Patient is that, unfortunately, all modern professionals,
including lawyers, approach their clients with silence
rather than conversations about risks and about the client's and the professional's perceptions and biases regarding those risks. 2 4
By proposing a way in which knowledge, organizational processes, and professions are interrelated, I believe that all students regardless of their pre-professional
orientation or lack thereof will understand the importance of reflection while acting. Or, to use Donald
Schon's phrase again, a practitioner is always engaged in
a "reflective conversation" with the situation that he or
she confronts in practice. 25 The uncertainties encountered in practice-those cases that do not fit the book
-are resolved though a form of on-the-spot experimentation.

Knowledge Processes and the Crisis of
Higher Education
The universities, at least those that are comprehensive
universities in the sense that they have undergraduate,

professional, and Ph.D. programs, are in a peculiar position vis-a-vis knowledge processes. On the one hand,
universities are supposed to "create new knowledge," be
it in biotechnology or literary theory; such social posturing justifies the public and private funds devoted to
research and graduate training. On the other hand, universities are supposed to provide the nation's "finest"
youth, by some definition of meritocracy, with a superior undergraduate education. Among university administrators and concerned faculty members, it has been
generally assumed since World War II that the undergraduate education function suffers because of the predominance of the research function. This perceived dichotomy of research and undergraduate education ignores the possibility that a form of learning for
undergraduates exists in comprehensive universities that
is distinct from the type of learning taking place within
traditional liberal arts colleges.
The undergraduate learning experience in the university could be consistent with the knowledge-creation
function of the university, if we were to desist from thinking of all undergraduates as underdeveloped graduate
students in pursuit of professional certification as
knowledge seekers. We could then be free to think of the
university as a learning environment where a coherent
education for the undergraduate would be possible. In
my view, such an undergraduate educational experience
would have three components:
1. Opportunities for excellent formal learning experiences through superior instruction in classes,
seminars, sections, and laboratories.

2. Opportunities for undergraduates to explore the
frontiers of knowledge through participation in
research activity. 26
3. Opportunities for mentoring from faculty members. We need to move from a procedural view of
faculty advising to one in which the faculty member sees him or herself as the student's "coach" in
the quest for knowledge.

If we accept the premise that an undergraduate education so constructed would be desirable, then the need
for drastic reform of our present system is obvious. We
might be tempted to go back to what apparently worked
for some students in the 1950s, as Professor Allan
Bloom suggests. 2 7 Or we could argue that reform is not
simply a matter of what Professor A or B does or fails to
do in the classroom, but a matter of understanding the
institutional processes of the university.
Such an understanding requires that we engage in
some "institutional experiments" 28 not only to discover
the most effective course of action, but also to define the
nature of the so-called crisis. A process of institutional
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experimentation should recognize that there are purposes underlying "classical liberal education" that are
worthy of respect. Additionally, we must understand
that the rhetorical call for relevance of the sixties and
the present concern for "skills" reflects a need on the
part of undergraduates to assimilate the knowledge they
perceive as relevant to their own anticipated work lives
and their own sense of meaning. In other words, trying
to change how teachers teach and what and how students learn should be seen as a process of human experimentation where deeply held values on the part of professors, students, alumni, members of boards of trustees,
parents, and government officials come into play. In
addition, this process of human experimentation requires the ability to articulate and debate a number of
theories of knowledge, both old and new. For instance,
the debate about whether "The Great Books" should
include work by women, black, Hispanic, and Asian
writers is in fact a debate about whether the structure of
coherent knowledge is a closed or open system. 29 Finally, this process of human experimentation requires
an ability to reflect upon the methods of pedagogy in
light of our emerging understanding of-and our students' perceived need for-the requisite, coherent
knowledge of the twenty-first century.
It is worth noting that little systematic attention has
been paid to those many undergraduates who enter the
university with clear-for seventeen- or eighteenyear-olds-professional objectives. This is not to suggest
that a narrow vocational curriculum for students within
a liberal arts program would be the optimal education
for these students, but it does ask us to consider what
and how to teach. Should there, for instance, be opportunities for undergraduates to learn about law or medicine, not as professional disciplines, but as basic institutions of society? Should there be learning opportunities for teachers and students to engage in what might
appear to be a professional activity such as a computeraided design course for non-architects? Should experience in the performing or visual arts be part of a new
concept of liberal learning? Might some learning activities be structured outside of the traditional semester
mode of learning? But perhaps more important than the
specific institutional experiments is:

colleagues to develop institutional strategies for changing teaching and learning within the university.
In my view, any attempt to restructure undergraduate education illuminates a wider confusion about the
purposes of research within the society. Those of us who
are associated with universities too easily assume that
the benefits of research are obvious to the larger society
or at least to the policy-makers in the society. But recent
criticisms of higher education and even some research
indicate that the mission of the university as a social
institution is not widely understood. To meet this challenge, we must rid ourselves of the simplistic view of the
university as a collection of students and scholars seeking knowledge or the truth. Rather, we should see the
university's mission as encompassing the broad functions of teaching, research, and public service.3° We
should understand that professors, those with the highest form of authority within the institution, should conceive of their roles as forms of public service. The university professor is thus a professional, in the best meaning of the word, one who uses his or her expertise in the
service of students and others in the society.

The Teaching-Learning Continuum: A Case
in Point
In the course of the seminar I mentioned earlier, on
Institutions and Social Responsibility, my graduate
teaching assistant and I were faced with helping a group
of students accommodate their differing perspectives on
the development of the bovine growth hormone, a biotechnology that will radically increase milk production
in dairy cattle. Since Cornell is one of the universities in
which the potential of this hormone is being tested, the
students had quickly understood the university's institutional involvement in producing and marketing this
product. They also understood that this new product
might ruin many small dairy farmers in New York State.
But they had no way of organizing their often conflicting ideas; the research team was, in effect, stuck conceptually.
Fortunately, I had introduced my graduate research
assistant to Katz's Experimentation with Human Beings
as a way of teaching him how case studies are developed. Seizing upon the students' stalemate as an opportunity to put Katz's thinking about human research to
practical use, he suggested they ask:

By whom and through what methods should any
such experiments be evaluated?

Who within the University is responsible for formulating the policy on the research involving the
effectiveness of bovine growth hormone?

No specific proposals above should necessarily be
adopted by any institution of higher education. These
are merely examples of the type of reflection, analysis,
and action or inaction that I derive from my understanding of Katz's thinking. His interdisciplinary approach to
experimentation with human beings has influenced not
only my way of teaching but my way of encouraging

He further suggested they interview some of the key
players on campus-a biologist doing the tests, a social
scientist who had raised questions about the appropriateness of this research at a land grant university,3' and
188
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versity for changing its Western culture course to include
works by "women, minorities and persons of color." Bennett,
quoted in James Atlas, 'The Battle of the Books' New York
Times, June 5, 1988, sec. 6; Schon illustrates a different aspect
of the crisis as he points to a loss of confidence in the professions since the mid- 197o's. See Schon, supra note 2, at 39·
5· See Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization (Beverly
Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1986), Ch. 2. This is only one
view of organizations that we might have derived from science
and technology. Morgan has also suggested that we might
view the organization as a biological organism. See Id.: Ch. 3·
6. Katz, supra note 1, at g-65.
7· Palmer, supra note 1, at 237· In my commentary on
Katz's book, I noted that: "Doctors, biological researchers,
and technocrats, however, are not the only modern day high
priests challenged in the book. To this order of high priests
belongs any definable group that is given authority, because of
its expert knowledge, to investigate other human beings or act
in their behalf."
8. Katz, supra note 1, at 523; See also Palmer, supra note
1, at 248. ·
g. Jay Katz, "Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's
Vision," University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 39 (1977):
1 37·
10. Katz, supra note g, at Ch. 7·
1 1. Larry Palmer, "Confronting Medical Ethics," 109
Cambridge Review, 728 (1g88): in press.
12. Katz, supra note 1, at 799·
13. See Schon, supra note 2, 21-go.
14. See Custody of A Minor, 379 NE 2d 1053 (1978).
15. Palmer, supra note 1, at 254·
16. The person from our writing program was present because this course was part of our attempts to increase the
amount of writing in the upper class undergraduate curriculum and thus is part of a larger institutional experiment that
we are conducting at Cornell.
17· Donald Schon, "Cornell: Marrying Science, Technology, Artistry, the Humanities, and Professional Practice," Cornell University Conference Proceedings, supra note 2, at 4·
18. Schon, supra note 2.
19. Morgan, supra note 5·
20. See Larry Palmer, Law, Medicine, and Social Justice.
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, forthcoming).
21. See William May, The Physician's Covenant: Images
of the Healer in Medical Ethics, (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1g8g).
22. See Palmer, supra note 11.
23. Palmer, supra note 1.
24. Katz, supra note 3·
25. Schon, supra note 2, at 141.
26. Larry Palmer, "Introduction to Proceedings," Cornell
Undergraduate Apprenticeship Program Proceedings (Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University, 1g88).
27. See Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).
28. Schon, supra note 18.
29. See, e.g., Atlas, supra note 4·
go. See, e.g., Derek Bok, Higher Learning (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1986).
31. Roger L. Geiger, To Advance Knowledge: The
Growth of the American Research Universities (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 5·

an economist who had written widely about the potential social and economic effects of the bovine growth
hormone. He went on to use the ideas of formulation,
implementation, and review of the research process as a
way of helping the students get beyond their idiosyncratic views of the problem.
That undergraduate students in 1988 find value in
Jay Katz's work of nearly fifteen years ago is a fitting
tribute to the power of that work. That a graduate student-a future professor-was able to use his work to
teach others is an even more significant tribute to Katz
as a scholar who always teaches. It is not only the undergraduates and graduate students who have benefited;
professional students in law and in medicine as well
have been enlightened by the power of his analysis of
research with human subjects. As his former student, I
am enormously indebted to him for providing me with
the tools to awaken within students that curiosity about
the way the human mind works, which is, after all, what
teaching is all about. As we ponder the direction of
higher education, those of us privileged to have been
associated with Jay Katz in our professional careers will
continue to look to his wisdom for guidance. His work
celebrates the best of university life, the creation, nurturing, and transfer of knowledge from many disciplines
for the human good.
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